I adapt the methods of Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) to estimate two dimensions of monetary policy during the 2009-2015 zero lower bound period in the U.S. I show that, after a suitable rotation, these two dimensions can be interpreted as "forward guidance" and "large-scale asset purchases" (LSAPs). I estimate the sizes of the forward guidance and LSAP components of each FOMC announcement between January 2009 and June 2015, and show that those estimates correspond closely to identifiable features of major FOMC announcements over that period. Forward guidance has relatively small effects on the longest-maturity Treasury yields and essentially no effect on corporate bond yields, while LSAPs have large effects on those yields but essentially no effect on short-term Treasuries. Both types of policies have significant effects on medium-term Treasury yields, stock prices, and exchange rates.
Introduction
lowered the federal funds rate-its traditional monetary policy instrument-to essentially zero in response to the most severe U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression. Because U.S. currency carries an interest rate of zero, it is essentially impossible for the FOMC to target a value for the federal funds rate that is substantially less than zero. Faced with this zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the FOMC subsequently began to pursue alternative, "unconventional" monetary policies, with particular emphasis on forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases (defined below). In this paper, I propose a new method to identify and estimate the effects of these two main types of unconventional monetary policy.
Understanding the effects of unconventional monetary policy is an important topic for both policymakers and researchers. Many central banks around the world have found themselves constrained by the zero lower bound on short-term nominal interest rates. Central banks faced with this constraint must pursue unconventional monetary policy if they wish to affect financial markets and/or the economy. Understanding the effects of different types of unconventional monetary policy, then, allows policymakers and researchers to better understand the efficacy, strengths, and weaknesses of the various alternatives.
The effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy is also an important determinant of the costs of the zero lower bound constraint. If unconventional monetary policy is relatively ineffective, then the ZLB constraint is more costly, and policymakers should go to greater lengths to prevent hitting the ZLB in the first place-such as by choosing a higher target rate of inflation, as advocated by several authors (see Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Mauro, 2010; The Wall Street Journal, 2010; and Ball, 2014) . On the other hand, if unconventional monetary policy is very effective, then the ZLB constraint is much less costly and policymakers do not need to take such drastic action to avoid hitting it in the future.
In the present paper, I focus on measuring the effects of forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases in particular, since those were the two types of unconventional monetary policy used most extensively by the Federal Reserve during the recent U.S. ZLB period. The term "forward guidance" refers to communication by the FOMC about the likely future path of the federal funds rate over the next several quarters or years. "Large-scale asset purchases" (or LSAPs) refers to purchases by the Federal Reserve of hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of longer-term assets, such as long-term U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities. The goals of Reserve, 2009 -2015 March 18, 2009 FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 basis points (bp) for "an extended period", and that it will purchase $750B of mortgage-backed securities, $300B of longer-term Treasuries, and $100B of agency debt (a.k.a. "QE1") November 3, 2010 FOMC announces it will purchase an additional $600B of longer-term Treasuries (a.k.a. "QE2") August 9, 2011 FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp "at least through mid-2013" September 21, 2011
FOMC announces it will sell $400B of short-term Treasuries and use the proceeds to buy $400B of long-term Treasuries (a.k.a. "Operation Twist") January 25, 2012 FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp "at least through late 2014" September 13, 2012
FOMC announces it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp "at least through mid-2015", and that it will purchase $40B of mortgage-backed securities per month for the indefinite future December 12, 2012 FOMC announces it will purchase $45B of longer-term Treasuries per month for the indefinite future, and that it expects to keep the federal funds rate between 0 and 25 bp at least as long as the unemployment remains above 6.5 percent and inflation expectations remain subdued December 18, 2013 FOMC announces it will start to taper its purchases of longer-term Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities to paces of $40B and $35B per month, respectively December 17, 2014 FOMC announces that "it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy"
both policies was to lower longer-term U.S. interest rates using methods other than changes in the current federal funds rate. Both types of unconventional monetary policy were used extensively by the Federal Reserve, as can be seen in Table 1 . Note that, in addition to the major unconventional monetary policy announcements listed in Table 1 , there was incremental news about these policies that was released to financial markets at almost every FOMC meeting, such as updates that a policy was ongoing, was likely to be continued, or might be adjusted.
A major challenge in identifying and estimating the effects of the FOMC's unconventional monetary policy announcements is determing the size and type of each announcement. For example, many of the statements in Table 1 prising markets and leading to a large effect on asset prices despite the fact that no action was announced. 2 This implies that even dates not listed in Table 1 could have produced a significant surprise in financial markets and led to large effects on asset prices and the economy.
Determining the type-forward guidance vs. LSAP-of any given announcement can also be very difficult. For example, many announcements in Table 1 clearly contain significant news about both types of policies, which makes disentangling the news on those dates challenging.
Even in the case of a seemingly clear-cut announcement, both types of policies may be at work:
in particular, several authors have argued that LSAPs affect the economy by changing financial market expectations about the future path of the federal funds rate (see, e.g., Woodford, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014) . To the extent that this channel is operative, even a pure LSAP announcement would have important forward guidance implications. This makes disentangling the two types of policies even more difficult than it might at first seem.
In this paper, I address these problems by adapting the methods of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005, henceforth Kuttner (2001) , Swanson (2005, 2007) , and others. 2 For example, The Wall Street Journal reported that "No Taper Shocks Wall Street," and "'Bernanke had a free pass to begin that tapering process and chose not to follow [through] . . . The Fed had the market precisely where it needed to be. The delay today has the effect of raising the benchmark to tapering. . . " (The Wall Street Journal, 2013b,c) .
by far the two most important components of FOMC announcements for financial markets, and thus their effects should be well captured by the first two principal components of the asset price responses. I then search over all possible rotations of these two principal components to find the specification in which one of the two factors has the clearest interpretation as a "forward guidance" factor, using the estimated effect of forward guidance from the pre-ZLB period (computed exactly as in GSS) as the benchmark for what the effects of forward guidance should look like.
The remaining, orthogonal factor can then be interpreted as the second main dimension of mon- Once the FOMC's forward guidance and LSAP announcements are identified, it's then straightforward to estimate the effects of each type of announcement on the high-frequency response of different types of asset prices around those announcements.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review the analytical methods of GSS, show how to adapt them to the recent ZLB period, and describe the data. In Section 3, I perform the principal component analysis and rotate the factors as described above.
I plot the estimated factors over time and discuss their relationship to identifiable features of major announcements by the FOMC over the ZLB period, showing that my estimates of forward guidance and LSAP announcements seem to be well identified and informative. In Section 4, I estimate the effects of these announcements on Treasury yields, stock prices, exchange rates, and corporate bond yields and spreads. In Section 5, I discuss the implications of my findings for monetary policy going forward.
Methods and Data
My methods in the present paper consist of two main steps. First, I extend the analysis of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) , which took place after financial markets had been closed for several days following the September 11 terrorist attacks. I also include the Federal Reserve Board's announcement on November 25, 2008, that it would begin purchasing mortgage-backed securities and GSE debt (the beginning of "QE1")-although this announcement was not made by the FOMC itself, all subsequent asset purchase announcements were made by the FOMC, so I include it with those others. However, including or excluding this announcement does not noticeably affect any of my results. 5 The reason for focusing on some rather than all of the possible futures contract rates in the dataset is to avoid Treasury yields provide information about interest rate expectations and risk premia over longer horizons, about 1 to 10 years.
These asset price responses to FOMC announcements can be written as a matrix X, with rows of X corresponding to FOMC announcements and columns of X corresponding to different futures rates and Treasury yields. Since there are 159 FOMC announcements from July 1991 through December 2008, and I focus on 8 asset price responses, the matrix X has dimensions 159 × 8.
As in GSS, I use principal component analysis to estimate the two factors that make the most important contribution to the variation in X. The idea is that the asset price responses in X are well described by a factor model,
where F is a 159×2 matrix containing two factors, Λ is a 2×8 matrix of loadings of the asset price responses on the two factors, and ε is a 159 × 8 matrix of white noise residuals. Letting F denote the first two principal components of X, the two columns of F represent the two components of the FOMC's announcements that have had the greatest impact on the assets in X over the period from July 1991 to December 2008.
Although the first two principal components of X explain a maximal fraction of the variation in X, they are only a statistical decomposition and typically do not have a structural interpretation. In order to associate one column of F with changes in the federal funds rate and the other column with changes in forward guidance-which is a structural interpretation-it's necessary to transform the factor matrix F so that it fits this interpretation.
Keeping this goal in mind, note that if F and Λ characterize the data X in equation (1), and U is any 2 × 2 orthogonal matrix, then the matrix F ≡ F U and loadings Λ ≡ U Λ represent an alternative factor model that fits the data X exactly as well as F and U , in the sense that it overlapping contracts as much as possible, since they are highly correlated for technical rather than policy-related reasons. When I conduct the principal components analysis of the data below, futures contracts that are highly correlated will tend to show up as a common factor, which would not be interesting if the correlation was generated by overlapping contracts rather than the way monetary policy is conducted. For example, FOMC announcements are generally spaced 6 to 8 weeks apart, so there is essentially no gain to including the second federal funds futures contract in addition to the first-the second contract is very highly correlated with the first fed funds futures contract, once the latter contract has been scaled to represent the outcome of the current FOMC meeting. Similarly, including the first Eurodollar futures contract would provide essentially no additional information beyond the first and third fed funds futures contracts. I follow GSS and switch from federal funds futures to Eurodollar futures contracts at a horizon of about 2 quarters because Eurodollar futures were much more liquid over this sample than longer-maturity fed funds futures, and are thus likely to provide a better measure of financial market expectations at those longer horizons (see Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2007) .
produces exactly the same residuals ε in equation (1). 6 Ideally, we would like the two columns of F to correspond to changes in the federal funds rate and changes in the FOMC's forward guidance, as mentioned above. Although the first two principal components of X do not in general have this interpretation, we can choose a rotation matrix U such that the rotated factors F do have such an interpretation. In particular, we can choose U such that, iff 1 andf 2 are the two columns of F , thenf 2 has no effect on the current federal funds rate. 7 This implies that all of the variation in the current federal funds rate (up to the white noise residuals ε) in response to FOMC announcements is due to changes in the first factor,f 1 . The scale of F and Λ are also indeterminate: if k is any scalar, then kF and Λ/k also fit the data X exactly as well as F and Λ. Traditionally, the scale of F is normalized so that each column has unit variance. 7 In other words,λ 21 = 0, whereλ ij denotes the (i, j)th element of Λ, so the current-month federal funds futures contract is not affected by changes in the second factor. 8 GSS calledf 1 the "target factor" andf 2 the "path factor", because it relates to the future path of the federal funds rate, but the latter is now typically referred to as "forward guidance". 9 The first and third federal funds futures contracts correspond to federal funds rate expectations over the next fourth Eurodollar futures contracts and the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields.
As in GSS and discussed above, I extract the first two principal components from the matrix X. These are the two features of FOMC announcements between 2009 and mid-2015 that moved the five yields listed above the most. As before, these two principal components do not have a structural interpretation in general. Let F zlb denote the 52 × 2 matrix of principal components, let U be a 2 × 2 orthogonal matrix, let F zlb ≡ F zlb U , and letf zlb 1 andf zlb 2 denote the first and second columns of F zlb . I search over all possible rotation matrices U to find the one where the first rotated factorf zlb 1 is as close as possible (in terms of its asset price effects) to the "forward guidance factor"f 2 estimated previously (over the 1991-2008 sample). 10 The identifying assumption is thus that the effect of forward guidance on medium-and longer-term interest rates during the ZLB period is about the same as it was during the pre-ZLB period from 1991-2008.
The remaining factor,f zlb 2 , then corresponds to the component of FOMC announcements, above and beyond changes in forward guidance, that have the biggest effect on medium-and longerterm interest rates. It is natural to interpret this second factor as corresponding to the FOMC's large-scale asset purchases.
The crucial assumption underlying this identification is that forward guidance has essentially the same effects on medium-and longer-term interest rates before and after the ZLB. This assumption is subject to debate, but it provides a natural starting point for my analysis and 
The FOMC's Forward Guidance and LSAP Announcements
I now report the results of these methods applied to the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods. Table 2 reports the rotated loading matrices Λ from the estimation procedure described above.
Federal Funds Rate and Forward Guidance Factors before the ZLB
The first two rows report results for the pre-ZLB period, July 1991 to December 2008. Each factor, futures rates to rise by 5.9, 5.6, and 4.8bp, respectively, and the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields to increase by 3.8, 1.9, and 0.7bp, respectively. The effects of a surprise change in the federal funds rate are thus largest at the short end of the yield curve and die off monotonically as the maturity of the interest rate increases.
The effects of forward guidance, in the second row, are quite different. By construction, a shock to the forward guidance factor has no effect on the current federal funds rate. At longer maturities, however, the forward guidance factor's effects increase, peaking at a maturity of about one year, and then dying off slightly for longer maturities. Thus, changes in forward guidance have a roughly hump-shaped effect on the yield curve. For longer-term yields, such as the 5-and
10-year yields, changes in forward guidance are a far more important source of variation than are changes in the federal funds rate, as originally emphasized by GSS.
Forward Guidance and LSAP Factors during the ZLB Period
The third and fourth rows of Table 2 report Table 2 rescales the coefficients in row 3 so that their correspondence to the second row can be seen more easily.)
The fourth row reports the effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in the FOMC's asset purchases. I normalize the sign of this factor so that an increase in purchases causes interest rates to fall. The effect on yields is relatively small at short and medium horizons but increases steadily with maturity-exactly the opposite of changes in the current federal funds rate. At a horizon of one year, the effect of LSAPs is only about 1bp, but for the 10-year Treasury yield, the effect is more than seven times larger, about 7.5bp.
Correspondence of Factors to Notable FOMC Announcements
In Figure 1 in the press. 11 The key elements of this program are listed in Table 1 , and the announcement seems to have been a major surprise to financial markets, given the huge estimated size of the factor on that date. Note that my identification procedure for forward guidance vs. LSAP announcements described above attributes the effects of this announcement to the LSAP factor. Given that this FOMC announcement placed such a large emphasis on asset purchases, my identification seems to be working well so far.
It's also interesting that the FOMC's subsequent "QE2" program, described in Table 1, August 9, 2011, is another interesting date in Figure 1 . That announcement marked the first time the FOMC gave explicit (rather than implicit) forward guidance about the likely path of the federal funds rate over the next several quarters. In that announcement, described in Table 1 , the FOMC stated that it expected the current (essentially zero) level of the federal funds rate would be appropriate "at least through mid-2013", a date almost two years in the future. Reassuringly, I estimate the announcement on this date as a negative 2-standard-deviation surprise in forward guidance, with essentially no LSAP component.
The next FOMC announcement, on September 21, 2011, corresponds to "Operation Twist", described in Table 1 Near the end of my sample, on December 17, 2014, markets expected the FOMC to remove its statement that it would keep the federal funds rate at essentially zero "for a considerable time".
Not only did the FOMC leave that phrase intact, it announced that "the Committee judges it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy," which was substantially more dovish than financial markets had expected. 13 This announcement thus appears to be correctly identified by my estimation as a large, negative 2.5-standard deviation decrease in forward guidance by the FOMC.
Finally, on March 18, 2015, the FOMC revised its projections for U.S. output, inflation, and the federal funds rate substantially downward, significantly below what markets had expected.
The revised forecast was read by financial markets "as a sign that the central bank would take its time in raising borrowing costs for the economy. . . " (The Wall Street Journal, 2015a,b) .
Again, my estimation appears to correctly identify this announcement as a substantial, negative 3-standard-deviation change in forward guidance.
Scale of Forward Guidance and LSAP Factors
The forward guidance and LSAP factors estimated above and plotted in Figure 1 are normalized to have a unit standard deviation over the sample. Similarly, the loadings in Table 2 are for these normalized factors and thus represent a basis points per standard deviation effect. For practical policy applications, however, it's more useful to convert these factors to a scale that is less abstract and more tangible.
For forward guidance, it's natural to think of the factor in terms of a 25bp effect on the Eurodollar future rate one year ahead, ED4. Note that a forward guidance announcement of this size would be very large by historical standards, equal to about a 6-standard-deviation surprise during the ZLB period, or a 4-standard-deviation surprise in the pre-ZLB period. 14 To estimate the effects of a forward guidance announcement of this magnitude, we can multiply the coefficients in the third row of Table 2 by a factor of about 6, which implies that the effects on the 5-and 13 For example, "U.S. stocks surged. . . after the Federal Reserve issued an especially dovish policy statement at the conclusion of the FOMC meetings," (The Wall Street Journal, 2014) . 14 Interestingly, I estimate that the FOMC's forward guidance announcements were larger on average before the ZLB than during the ZLB, as can be seen in Table 2 . One explanation for why this may be is that, once the FOMC issued its "mid-2013" forward guidance, there were essentially no updates or news about that guidance for many meetings. Similarly, after the FOMC revised the guidance to "late 2014", there were again no updates or news about that guidance for many more meetings, and so on.
10-year Treasury yields would be about 25.5 and 14.2bp, respectively. The interpretation is that, if the FOMC gave forward guidance for the federal funds rate that was about 25bp lower one year ahead than financial markets expected, then the 5-and 10-year Treasury yields would decline by about 25.5 and 14.2bp on average.
For LSAPs, we would like the units to be in billions of dollars of purchases, which is a more difficult transformation than a simple renormalization of the coefficients in Table 2 . Nevertheless, a number of estimates in the literature suggest that a $600 billion LSAP operation in the U.S., distributed across medium-and longer-term Treasury securities, leads to a roughly 15bp decline in the 10-year Treasury yield (see, e.g., Swanson, 2011, and Table 1 of Williams, 2013). Using this estimate as a benchmark implies that the coefficients in the fourth row of Table 2 correspond to a roughly $300 billion surprise LSAP announcement. Thus, it seems reasonable to interpret the coefficients in that row of Table 2 as corresponding to a $300 billion change in purchases. The interpretation is thus that, if the FOMC announced a new LSAP program that was about $300 billion larger than markets expected, the effects would be about as large those provided in the fourth row of Table 2 .
The Effects of Forward Guidance and LSAPs on Asset Prices
Once we've identified the forward guidance and LSAP components of the FOMC's announcements from 2009 through 2015, it's relatively straightforward to estimate the effects of those announcements on asset prices, using ordinary least squares regressions, as follows. 
Treasury Yields
where t indexes FOMC announcements between January 2009 and June 2015, y denotes the corresponding Treasury yield, Δ denotes the change in a 30-minute window bracketing each 
where t indexes FOMC announcements between Jan. 2009 and June 2015, y denotes a given Treasury yield, F denotes the forward guidance and LSAP factors estimated previously, and Δ is the intraday change in a 30-minute window bracketing each FOMC announcement. Coefficients are in units of basis points per standard deviation change in the monetary policy instrument. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses; t-statistics in square brackets; * * * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. See text for details.
FOMC announcement, F zlb denotes the forward guidance and LSAP factors as estimated above, ε is a regression residual, and α and β are parameters.
The point estimates for the 2-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields in Table 3 are the same as those in Table 2 . However, Table 3 also reports Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and t-statistics for each coefficient, from which we can see that the responses of these yields to both forward guidance and LSAPs are extraordinarily statistically significant, with t-statistics ranging from 8.8 to almost 17. The regression R 2 values are also quite high, over 93 percent, so these two factors explain a very large share of the variation in those yields around FOMC announcements. Table 3 also reports results for the 6-month and 30-year Treasury yields, which were not included in the estimation of the factors themselves. 15 LSAPs do not have a statistically significant effect on the 6-month Treasury yield, and the effect of forward guidance on this yield is statistically significant but small, amounting to only about 0.5bp per standard deviation surprise, less than one-sixth the size of the 2-year Treasury yield response. This is likely due to the fact that the 6-month Treasury yield was very close to zero and largely unresponsive to news over much of this period (Swanson and Williams, 2014) . To the extent that the 6-month Treasury yield was pinned 15 Results for the 3-month Treasury yield are not reported, since the 3-month Treasury yield generally did not respond to news over this period, as shown by see Swanson and Williams (2014) . Coefficients β from regressions Δ log
where t indexes FOMC announcements between Jan. 2009 and June 2015, x is the asset price, F denotes the forward guidance and LSAP factors estimated previously, and Δ is the intraday change in a 30-minute window bracketing each FOMC announcement. Coefficients are in units of percentage points per standard deviation change in the monetary policy instrument. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses; t-statistics in square brackets; * * * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. See text for details.
to zero for a significant part of the sample, we wouldn't expect to see much of a response to any type of announcement.
The effect of forward guidance on the 30-year Treasury yield is also quantitatively small and, in this case, statistically insignificant. In contrast to the 6-month Treasury, the 30-year Treasury yield was not pinned to zero for any length of time during this period, so the small coefficient reflects the fact that forward guidance apparently had little effect on the longestmaturity Treasuries during the ZLB period. The effect of LSAPs on the 30-year Treasury yield, however, are large and extraordinarily statistically significant, with a t-statistic of almost 12.
Interestingly, the effects of LSAPs on the 30-year yield were not quite as large as their effects on the 10-year yield, presumably because the FOMC's LSAP operations were typically concentrated around maturities closer to 10 years. Table 4 reports analogous regression results for the S&P 500 stock index and dollar-euro and dollar-yen exchange rates. The form of the regressions is the same as in equation (2), except the dependent variable in each regression is now 100 times the log change in the asset price in each column.
Stock Prices and Exchange Rates
As can be seen in Table 4 , both forward guidance and LSAPs have statistically significant effects on stock prices and exchange rates. For stocks, a one-standard-deviation increase in forward guidance caused prices to fall by about 0.2 percent, while a one-standard-deviation increase in LSAPs caused stock prices to rise by a similar amount. Both of these coefficients are highly statistically significant, with t-statistics of about 2.7 and 3.7, respectively, and both effects are in the direction one would expect from a standard dividend-discount model, given the interest rate responses reported in the previous table; that is, an increase in interest rates reduces the present value of a stock's dividends (and may reduce the size of the dividends themselves, if the economy contracts), which will tend to cause stock prices to fall. Finally, it's interesting that the R 2 for this regression is much lower than those for Treasury yields, due to the high and idiosyncratic volatility of stock prices around FOMC announcements.
The effects of forward guidance and LSAPs on the dollar are more precisely estimated.
Both the dollar-euro and dollar-yen exchange rates are expressed as the dollar price per unit of foreign currency. In response to a one-standard-deviation increase in forward guidance, the dollar appreciated by about 0.2 to 0.25 percent, and the effect is highly statistically significant, with tstatistics of about 6.7 for the euro and 5 for the yen. A one-standard-deviation increase in LSAPs causes the dollar to depreciate about 0.35 percent, and the effect is again highly statistically significant with t-statistics of 6.6 and 7.3. Again, the effects have the signs one would expect from uncovered interest parity, given the response of interest rates reported in Table 3 . That is, an increase in U.S. interest rates makes U.S. dollar investments more attractive relative to foreign investments, and tends to drive the value of the dollar up. yields rise modestly in response to a change in forward guidance, the effect on the corporate-Treasury yield spread is thus modestly negative, falling about 1 to 2bp in response to an increase in guidance, and this effect is moderately statistically significant, with t-statistics of 2.2 and 2.5.
Corporate Bond Yields and Spreads
The effect of LSAPs on corporate bond yields was much larger and more significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in LSAPs caused the Aaa and Baa yields both to fall about 5bp, and the effect was extraordinarily statistically significant. However, the effect of LSAPs on the 10-year Treasury yield was larger than the effect on corporate bond yields, so the spread between corporate bonds and Treasuries actually increased in response to the LSAP program. 16 This result echoes findings by earlier authors, such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Swanson (2011) , that the Fed's LSAP programs-which tend to be concentrated in U.S. Treasury securities-push down Treasury yields more than they do private-sector yields. Nevertheless, the effect on corporate bond yields that I estimate here is a bit bigger than those authors found in their studies. For example, Swanson (2011) estimated corporate bond yields fall by about 4-5bp 16 The 10-year yield response in Table 2 is estimated to be about −7.5bp, while the effect implied in Table 5 is a bit larger, about −8.9bp. There are two reasons for this difference: first, the responses in Table 2 are 30-minute responses, while those in Table 5 are one-day responses. Second, Table 2 uses the on-the-run coupon-bearing 10-year Treasury bond, while in Table 5 I use the 10-year zero-coupon yield estimate by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) . The latter yield has a longer duration than the coupon-bearing 10-year security, which should be a better match to the long-term corporate bonds in the Moody's indexes.
in response to a $600 billion Treasury LSAP, while the estimates in Table 5 are closer to 9-10bp for the same size operation (assuming this is a roughly two-standard-deviation announcement, as discussed earlier). One reason for the larger estimates here may be because the FOMC's recent LSAP programs often included a substantial quantity of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as well as Treasuries. Those MBS are likely to be closer substitutes for corporate bonds than are Treasuries, so we should expect purchases of MBS to have a relatively larger effect on corporate bond yields than purchases of Treasuries alone. The earlier estimates in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Swanson (2011) were for the case of a Treasury-only LSAP, and thus could be expected to have smaller effects on private yields than the MBS-and-Treasury LSAPs conducted by the FOMC between 2009 and 2015.
Conclusions
In this paper, I show how to identify and estimate the forward guidance and large-scale asset purchase component of every FOMC announcement between 2009 and 2015, the U.S. zero lower bound period. Building on earlier work by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) , I estimate a time series for each type of unconventional monetary policy announcement, and show that these series correspond to identifiable characteristics of important FOMC statements during this period. I use these identified forward guidance and LSAP announcements to estimate the effects of each type of policy on Treasury yields, stock prices, exchange rates, and corporate bond yields and spreads. I find that forward guidance affected Treasury yields at all but the very longest maturities, with a peak effect at a maturity of about one to five years. In contrast, I find that the effects of LSAPs increased with maturity, with LSAPs having their peak effect on the longest maturities, 10 and 30 years. LSAPs had essentially no effect on the shortest-maturity Treasuries.
I estimate that forward guidance had no effect on corporate bond yields during the ZLB period. In contrast, LSAPs had substantial and highly significant effects on those yields. Nevertheless, the effects of LSAPs on corporate debt was smaller than their effects on Treasuries, so corporate bond spreads actually increased after an increase in the FOMC's asset purchases. This finding is consistent with others in the literature, and probably reflects the fact that the Fed's LSAP programs focused largely on purchases of Treasury securities.
Stock prices responded about equally to changes in forward guidance and LSAPs over the zero lower bound period. This is perhaps surprising, given that forward guidance seems to have been relatively unimportant for other long-duration assets, such as the 30-year Treasury and corporate bonds. Forward guidance certainly had much smaller effects than LSAPs on these other long-duration assets.
Finally, I estimate that forward guidance and LSAPs both had significant effects on exchange rates, with LSAPs moderately more important. An increase in U.S. interest rates due to either forward guidance or LSAPs caused the U.S. dollar to appreciate, consistent with a standard uncovered interest parity channel.
Looking forward, it's natural to ask which policy is more effective. The answer is, it depends.
First, it's difficult to compare the scale of the two different types of policies-for example, is a $100 billion LSAP operation large or small, and is it larger or smaller than a 25bp change in forward guidance about the federal funds rate one year ahead? One natural way of comparing magnitudes across the two types of policies is in terms of their historical importance: over the 2009-2015 period, a one-standard-deviation change in forward guidance by the FOMC corresponded to a change of about 6bp in federal funds rate expectations one year ahead, while a one-standarddeviation change in LSAPs corresponded to a roughly $300 billion change in bond purchases.
Using these estimates as a basis for comparison, a one-standard-deviation (6bp) change in forward guidance appears to have been about as effective at changing medium-term Treasury yields, stock prices, and exchange rates as a one-standard-deviation ($300B) change in LSAPs. However, LSAPs were much more effective at changing long-term Treasury yields and corporate bond yields, while forward guidance was more effective at moving shorter-maturity Treasury yields.
Finally, the analysis in this paper suggests at least three important avenues for future research. First, it's important to investigate the persistence of the effects estimated above. Wright (2012) does not distinguish between forward guidance and LSAPs, but finds that unconventional monetary policy as a whole had effects that died out with a half-life of just 2-3 months between November 2008 and September 2011. In ongoing research, I am studying the persistence of the effects of forward guidance and LSAPs on financial markets between 2009 and 2015. Second, the time series of forward guidance and LSAP announcements estimated above can be used to investigate the effects of these announcements on macroeconomic as well as financial variables, which I am also pursuing in ongoing work. Third, the analysis above sheds no light on the relative costs of forward guidance vs. LSAPs. Obviously, whether one type of policy should be preferred to the other in practice depends on its costs as well as its effects, which makes the former an important avenue for future research as well as the latter.
